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A tudósítás véget ér. A történet nem.
A folytatással elfogadod az Általános Szerződési Feltételeket.
How a concealed flight-control software led to 346 deaths, a prosecution that collapsed, and a safety culture still under scrutiny
In two crashes five months apart, three hundred and forty-six people died aboard Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. Investigators found that a concealed flight-control system called MCAS pushed both planes into the ground, and that pilots had never been told it existed. Boeing eventually admitted a conspiracy to defraud its own regulator — yet nearly nine years on, the company has not been criminally convicted of anything.
On the eighth of March, two thousand and seventeen, the FAA granted Boeing an amended type certificate for the 737 MAX 8. According to the House Committee's later investigation, MCAS was not disclosed to pilots in their flight manuals, and FAA managers were never fully informed of how Boeing had expanded the system's authority.
Two months later, in May of that year, the 737 MAX began carrying paying passengers with Malaysian carrier Malindo Air. MCAS remained unknown to every line pilot who flew it.
On the twenty-ninth of October, two thousand and eighteen, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea thirteen minutes after takeoff from Jakarta, killing all one hundred and eighty-nine people on board. According to Indonesia's accident investigation, a faulty angle-of-attack sensor triggered repeated MCAS nose-down commands. The crew, never told MCAS existed, lost control.
In November, Boeing and the FAA reviewed MCAS but did not ground the fleet. The FAA issued a directive telling crews to follow existing runaway-stabiliser procedures — a procedure that assumed pilots knew what was fighting them.
On the tenth of March, two thousand and nineteen, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed near Bishoftu six minutes after takeoff from Addis Ababa, killing all one hundred and fifty-seven on board. According to the accident investigation bureau's final report, MCAS again activated on false sensor data and repeatedly pitched the nose down against the crew's inputs.
On the thirteenth of March, the FAA ordered all US-registered MAX aircraft grounded — but it was not first. China had acted on the eleventh, followed by the European Union and Canada. Within a week, roughly fourteen hundred daily MAX flights had fallen to zero worldwide.
On the sixteenth of September, two thousand and twenty, the House Transportation Committee published its final report, calling the crashes a horrific culmination of faulty engineering assumptions, a lack of transparency by Boeing's management, and grossly insufficient FAA oversight. It found that mentions of MCAS had been removed from pilot manuals entirely.
On the eighteenth of November, the FAA lifted the grounding. Boeing had redesigned MCAS to draw on both angle-of-attack sensors, limited it to a single activation per event, and capped its total authority. Mandatory simulator training was added — something Boeing had successfully resisted during original certification.
On the seventh of January, two thousand and twenty-one, Boeing and the Justice Department signed a deferred prosecution agreement. Boeing paid two-point-five billion dollars and admitted conspiring to defraud the FAA. If it committed no new violations over three years, the criminal charge would be dismissed. The DOJ negotiated the deal without notifying victims' families as required by federal law.
Later that January, EASA cleared the modified MAX to return to European skies, independently of Boeing and the FAA, requiring software upgrades, wiring rework, and updated crew training.
On the sixteenth of December, fifteen families filed motions in federal court in Texas arguing the Justice Department had secretly cut the DPA without consulting them, violating the Crime Victims' Rights Act. They sought Boeing's arraignment and access to evidence.
On the twenty-first of October, two thousand and twenty-two, Judge O'Connor ruled that the three hundred and forty-six victims are legally crime victims under federal law and that the DOJ had violated its obligations. He ordered Boeing arraigned on the felony fraud charge. Boeing pleaded not guilty.
On the eighteenth of December, two thousand and twenty-three, the Fifth Circuit ruled the families' challenge had been premature — but confirmed that CVRA violations could still provide grounds to refuse dismissal of the charges when the time came.
On the fifth of January, two thousand and twenty-four, a door plug blew out of an Alaska Airlines 737 MAX 9 as it climbed through fourteen thousand feet over Portland. No one died, but the NTSB found four retaining bolts were missing — removed during Boeing factory rework and never reinstalled.
The next day, the sixth of January, the FAA capped MAX production at thirty-eight aircraft per month and launched a full audit of Boeing's manufacturing processes and supply chain.
On the fourteenth of May, the DOJ notified Boeing it had breached the 2021 agreement by failing to implement adequate compliance and safety measures, making the company again subject to criminal prosecution.
On the seventh of July, Boeing agreed in principle to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, with fines of up to four hundred and eighty-seven million dollars. Victims' families immediately called it a sweetheart deal that failed to reflect three hundred and forty-six deaths.
In December, Judge O'Connor rejected that plea agreement, finding it was not in the public interest. Boeing was neither convicted nor exonerated, and the incoming Trump administration inherited the case with full authority to renegotiate.
On the eighteenth of May, the Justice Department announced it would drop the criminal charge in exchange for a new non-prosecution agreement. Boeing would pay an additional two hundred and forty-three million dollars in penalties and four hundred and forty-four million to victims' families, but face no conviction. Families vehemently opposed it.
In September, the FAA restored Boeing's limited authority to self-issue airworthiness certificates for some MAX and 787 aircraft — authority stripped after the two thousand and nineteen crashes — describing the restoration as conditional on sustained quality performance.
On the third of September, thirty-one victims' families appeared before Judge O'Connor in Fort Worth to oppose the non-prosecution agreement. They told the court the deal violated judicial-review rules and dishonored the dead. Families noted they had been unable to secure a single meeting with the Attorney General despite months of requests.
On the seventeenth of October, the FAA raised the production cap from thirty-eight to forty-two aircraft per month, saying inspectors had found sufficient quality improvements on Boeing's lines.
On the sixth of November, Judge O'Connor dismissed the criminal conspiracy charge at the Justice Department's request. He said the families' arguments were compelling and that he personally disagreed the dismissal served the public interest — but that precedent left him no choice. Boeing walked away without a criminal conviction for the deaths of three hundred and forty-six people.
On the thirteenth of November, families filed an emergency petition with the Fifth Circuit asking it to reverse the dismissal and enforce their rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act.
On the thirty-first of March, two thousand and twenty-six, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit unanimously upheld the dismissal. The court found the Justice Department had met its obligations under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. Families' attorney Paul Cassell called the ruling badly flawed, saying Boeing had escaped criminal accountability for three hundred and forty-six deaths. The criminal case is now closed.
On the thirty-first of May, the FAA approved a further production increase to forty-seven MAX aircraft per month. Boeing's chief executive said the MAX 7 and MAX 10 variants, still uncertified, were expected to receive their certificates before the end of the year.
Boeing was never convicted of a crime in connection with the deaths of three hundred and forty-six people. The company paid roughly two-point-five billion dollars across various agreements — less than it earned in a single profitable quarter before the crashes. Production is rising, new variants are nearing certification, and the FAA's oversight is described as improved. What has not changed is this: the families were never consulted when the original deal was made, and every legal avenue they pursued to change that ended the same way.